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A B S T R A C T   
SARS-CoV-2, the cause of COVID-19, infected over 100 million people globally by February 2021. Reverse 
zoonotic transmission of SARS-CoV-2 from humans to other species has been documented in pet cats and dogs, 
big cats and gorillas in zoos, and farmed mink. As SARS-CoV-2 is closely related to known bat viruses, assessment 
of the potential risk of transmission of the virus from humans to bats, and its subsequent impacts on conservation 
and public health, is warranted. A qualitative risk assessment was conducted by a multi-disciplinary group to 
assess this risk in bats in the Australian context, with the aim of informing risk management strategies for human 
activities involving interactions with bats. The overall risk of SARS-CoV-2 establishing in an Australian bat 
population was assessed to be Low, however with a High level of uncertainty. The outcome of the assessment 
indicates that, for the Australian situation where the prevalence of COVID-19 in humans is very low, it is 
reasonable for research and rehabilitation of bats to continue, provided additional biosecurity measures are 
applied. Risk assessment is challenging for an emerging disease where information is lacking and the situation is 
changing rapidly; assessments should be revised if human prevalence or other important factors change signif-
icantly. The framework developed here, based on established animal disease risk assessment approaches adapted 
to assess reverse zoonotic transmission, has potential application to a range of wildlife species and situations.   
1. Introduction 
SARS-CoV-2 is a human betacoronavirus closely related to known bat 
coronaviruses, particularly those found in bats from the Rhinolophus 
genus [1–3]. The progenitor of SARS-CoV-2 likely exists or existed in 
bats; however, the chain of transmission to humans and the possible 
involvement of an intermediate host are unknown [4,5]. There are over 
80 species of bats in nine families in Australia [6], and coronavirus 
surveillance has been conducted in around 40 of these [7]. While alpha- 
and betacoronaviruses have been found in Australian bats [7–9] there 
have been no detections to date of Sarbecoviruses or Merbecoviruses 
(SARS-CoV-1, MERS-CoV, SARS-CoV-2 and related viruses) in bats or 
other wildlife in Australia. However, serological evidence of exposure to 
a coronavirus antigenically related to SARS-CoV-1 has been found in 
multiple bat species [8–10]. 
The COVID-19 pandemic is caused by infection with the SARS-CoV-2 
virus. As of 7 February 2021 there were over 100 million human cases of 
COVID-19 reported globally, including 28,848 in Australia [11]. 
Human-to-human transmission is primarily via respiratory droplets in 
close contact situations and aerosol transmission under particular con-
ditions [12]. SARS-CoV-2 may also be spread via fomites [12,13], with 
studies under controlled laboratory conditions showing virus can remain 
viable on surfaces for hours to days, depending on the material [14]. 
There are a small number of reports of human-to-animal trans-
mission of SARS-CoV-2 in pet cats and dogs [15] and in gorillas, tigers, 
lions and other felines in zoos in the USA, Europe and South Africa 
* Corresponding author. 
E-mail address: kcox-witton@wildlifehealthaustralia.com.au (K. Cox-Witton).  
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect 
One Health 
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/onehlt 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.onehlt.2021.100247 
Received 18 February 2021; Received in revised form 7 April 2021; Accepted 8 April 2021   
One Health 13 (2021) 100247
2
[16–20]. Initial human-to-animal transmission has resulted in sustained 
outbreaks in farmed mink in Europe and North America [21–23], with 
likely mink-to-human transmission reported in the Netherlands [24]. 
Infection has also been identified in wild mink in the USA [25]. Exper-
imental infection of Egyptian fruit bats (Rousettus aegyptiacus) resulted 
in a transient subclinical respiratory infection with oral and faecal 
shedding, and virus detection in an in-contact bat [26]. Big brown bats 
(Eptesicus fuscus), a common North American species, showed no evi-
dence of SARS-CoV-2 infection after experimental infection [27]. 
Given the probable source of SARS-CoV-2 or its progenitor is a bat 
species, the potential risk of reverse zoonotic transmission from humans 
to bats and the subsequent negative impacts on conservation and public 
health have been recognised globally. This risk has been assessed for 
North American bats [28,29] and bats in the UK [30], for bats globally 
by the IUCN SSG Bat Specialist Group [31–33], and for wildlife more 
broadly [34]. In Australia, the considerably lower prevalence of COVID- 
19 and the different nature of human-bat interactions highlighted the 
need for an assessment specific to this biogeographical context. 
A working group of government and non-government stakeholders 
established by Wildlife Health Australia (WHA) developed interim bio-
security guidance for those interacting with bats, and agreed that a 
formal risk assessment should be conducted [35]. A small multi- 
disciplinary subgroup conducted a qualitative rapid risk assessment of 
transmission of SARS-CoV-2 from humans to bats in Australia, using a 
collective group approach. The purpose of the assessment was primarily 
to inform risk management strategies for human activities involving 
interactions with bats. Our approach may also have application for 
different scenarios in other countries. 
The assessment described here reflects the knowledge and situation 
current at the time (July–August 2020). Given the dynamic situation 
with COVID-19, it is likely that the assessment will need to be revised 
over time; however, the risk analysis framework developed and the 
documented rationale will allow the process to be undertaken rapidly 
when new information becomes available or the situation changes. 
2. Methods 
The assessment was conducted by a group of six assessors with 
expertise in bat ecology, veterinary epidemiology/disease ecology, 
emerging diseases, virology, immunology, wildlife health and disease 
risk assessment. It was undertaken from May to August 2020 using data 
and information available at that time. The risk was assessed collec-
tively, using a combination of available scientific literature and expert 
opinion of the group members. Input on specific details was sought from 
outside the group when needed. An initial draft was sent to three re-
viewers with expertise in disease risk assessment and decision science, 
and the final draft was reviewed by the broader WHA working group. 
A qualitative risk assessment approach was chosen due to the lack of 
quantitative information on the majority of relevant parameters (e.g. 
number of human-bat interactions, level of susceptibility of bats to 
SARS-CoV-2 infection, viral shedding characteristics, etc.) and for con-
sistency with Australian Government risk assessments. The process was 
based on that used for import risk analysis [36], with the addition of 
elements from published animal disease risk assessments [37,38], as 
outlined below. 
The risk question was defined as: “What is the risk of SARS-CoV-2 
establishing in an Australian bat population as a result of human-to- 
bat transmission?”. The hazard was defined as SARS-CoV-2. The risk 
period was defined as 6–12 months from the commencement of the 
assessment. 
The risk assessment process was based on the principle of “Risk =
Likelihood x Consequence”, conducted according to published methods 
and Australian and UK guidelines, as follows:  
1. Likelihood assessment  
a. likelihood of introduction of the virus (hazard) (Table 1) [39]  
b. likelihood of exposure and establishment (Table 1) [39]  
c. likelihood of occurrence (1a x 1b) (Table 2) [38]  
2. Consequence assessment (Table 3) [40]  
3. Overall risk assessment (1 x 2) (Table 4) [36] 
The level of uncertainty of each score was rated using the scale 
defined in Table 5, and the uncertainty scores were combined by using 
the highest score for any of the steps [38]. Where information was 
lacking, or where considerable variation in risk components was ex-
pected, a precautionary approach to scoring was taken that tended to-
wards a higher likelihood and a higher uncertainty rating. 
The scope was restricted to people with occupational interaction 
with bats (specifically bat carers/rehabilitators, researchers and 
ecological consultants) and recreational visitors to caves. Veterinary 
staff were not specifically included; however, much of the assessment is 
also relevant to those working in a veterinary capacity. While members 
of the public also interact with bats, this is generally only a single 
instance of short-lived contact. ‘Interaction’ includes physical contact, 
being in close proximity, and indirect contact via surfaces or fomites. 
The assessment was conducted assuming a baseline level of risk miti-
gation measures, i.e. standard biosecurity practices in use prior to the 
COVID-19 pandemic. An infected person was assumed to be shedding 
viable virus. For the purpose of this risk assessment, we considered 
flying-foxes (Pteropus spp.) separately from the other Australian bat 
species, due to differences in the nature of interactions with humans 
between these groups. The assessment assumes that SARS-CoV-2 is not 
already present in bats in Australia. 
3. Results 
3.1. Likelihood assessment 
The introduction pathway for SARS-CoV-2 into Australian bat pop-
ulations was identified as the interaction between an infected person 
and a bat within Australia (Fig. 1). Other possible pathways were 
identified, such as migration of an infected bat into Australia, but were 
not considered of sufficient likelihood to assess further. 
3.1.1. Introduction assessment 
In assessing the likelihood that the hazard (SARS-CoV-2) is intro-
duced into the immediate physical environment of an Australian bat, the 
primary consideration was the very low prevalence of COVID-19 in the 
human population in Australia at the time of the assessment and the low 
number of people interacting with bats. As of 19 August (at the 
completion of the assessment), there were 23,993 confirmed cases of 
SARS-CoV-2 infection in Australia, of which 7434 were active, and 
5,440,495 tests had been conducted [41]. This was around the peak of 
transmission experienced in Australia, so it represented a worst-case 
scenario to date. On 16 August, the rate of infection of locally ac-
quired cases was 73.3 per 100,000 population, and for the preceding two 
weeks was 14.8 per 100,000 population [42]. The likelihood of intro-
duction was assessed as Extremely Low, with an uncertainty score of Low 
(Table 6). 
Table 1 
Scoring system for assessing likelihood (adapted from [39]).  
Description Definition 
Negligible The event would almost certainly not occur 
Extremely low The event would be extremely unlikely to occur 
Very low The event would be very unlikely to occur 
Low The event would be unlikely to occur 
Moderate The event would be likely to occur 
High The event would be very likely to occur  
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3.1.2. Exposure and establishment assessment 
The likelihood of exposure of susceptible individual bats and estab-
lishment in a wild bat population was considered to be different for 
flying-foxes (Pteropus spp.) and the other bat species due to factors such 
as susceptibility to SARS-CoV-2 infection, numbers in care, field capture 
methods, and ecological characteristics such as colony size and social 
interactions. Similarly, the nature of interactions with bats and bio-
security practices differ between categories of people (bat rehabilitators, 
researchers and ecological consultants, recreational visitors to caves). 
For each pathway, the component steps were considered, as described 
below. The likelihood of exposure and establishment was assessed as 
Low for the pathway involving a bat rehabilitator and flying-fox, and 
Very Low for all other pathways; the uncertainty score was High for all 
pathways (Table 7). 
3.1.2.1. Bat is exposed to an infectious dose of SARS-CoV-2 by direct or 
indirect contact with an infected person 
3.1.2.1.1. Bat rehabilitators. In Australia, wildlife rehabilitators 
rescue and care for sick, injured and orphaned wildlife with the aim of 
rehabilitation and release back into the wild. Bat rehabilitators are 
generally volunteers, and bats may be kept in the rehabilitator’s home, 
in an outdoor enclosure, or in some cases in an established rehabilitation 
centre. The number of bats in care across Australia is not centrally 
recorded, but is likely to be in the thousands per year [43]. Biosecurity 
practices vary significantly among rehabilitators; for this assessment, a 
basic level of biosecurity was assumed. The exposure likelihood was 
scored higher for flying-foxes than other bat species, as significantly 
more flying-foxes come into care and they are generally held in care for a 
longer time (J. Mclean, Tolga Bat Hospital, personal communication). 
3.1.2.1.2. Researchers and consultants. Biosecurity for researchers 
was assumed to range from a medium to high level. A higher level of 
personal protective equipment (PPE) is generally used with flying-foxes 
than other bat species, and blowing on smaller bats (e.g. to encourage 
movement or to release their hold) is common practice (J. Welbergen, 
unpublished observation). Compared with rehabilitators, the average 
contact between researchers and bats is considerably shorter, less 
frequent, not as physically close, and usually outdoors. 
3.1.2.1.3. Cave visitors. Caves are an enclosed environment with 
shared airspace and limited ventilation, some caves have very large 
colonies of bats, and high numbers of general public including tourists 
visit some caves. However, most of the ‘show’ caves open to the public 
do not have bats, or where bats are present they tend to roost high up in 
the cave (N. White, Australian Speleological Federation, personal 
communication), and there are codes of practice for recreational and 
scientific use of caves to avoid disturbance of bats [44]. Close encounters 
with bats may occur, but only infrequently and usually only for 
advanced club cavers (N. White, personal communication). There is a 
high level of uncertainty due to variability in cave visitation and con-
ditions, seasonal movements of bats, and the unknown potential for viral 
particles to aerosolise inside caves. 
3.1.2.2. Bat becomes infected with SARS-CoV-2. The susceptibility of 
Australian bat species to SARS-CoV-2 is unknown. The following factors 
contributed to the assessment: a) the premise that bats are likely the 
source of the progenitor of SARS-CoV-2; b) the potential for immunity 
Table 2 
Matrix for combining introduction and exposure/establishment (adapted from [38]).    
Introduction 
Negligible Extremely low Very low Low Moderate High 
Exposure & establishment Negligible N N N N N N 
Extremely low N EL EL EL EL EL 
Very low N EL VL VL VL VL 
Low N EL VL L L L 
Moderate N EL VL L M M 
High N EL VL L M H  
Table 3 
Scoring system for assessing consequences (adapted from [40]).  
Description Definition 
Insignificant No detectable conservation or welfare effects 
Very minor Local short-term population loss, no significant ecosystem effect; OR 
mild animal welfare effects 
Minor Some localised, reversible ecosystem impact; OR mild animal welfare 
effects 
Moderate Measurable long-term damage to populations and/or ecosystem, but 
little spread, no extinction; OR more significant animal welfare 
effects 
High Long-term irreversible ecosystem change, spreading beyond local 
area; OR significant animal welfare effects 
Catastrophic Widespread, long-term population loss affecting several species OR 
extinction of a species, serious ecosystem effects; OR severe animal 
welfare effects  
Table 4 
Matrix for combining likelihood and consequences (adapted from [36]).    
Consequences 
Insignificant Very minor Minor Moderate High Catastrophic 
Likelihood High N VL L M H E 
Moderate N VL L M H E 
Low N N VL L M H 
Very low N N N VL L M 
Extremely low N N N N VL L 
Negligible N N N N N VL 
N = Negligible risk; VL = Very low risk; L = Low risk; M = Moderate risk; H = High risk; E = Extreme risk. 
Table 5 
Rating scale for level of uncertainty.  
Description Definition 
Low Strong level of confidence in the assessment. Scientific evidence and/ 
or previous experience of similar situations is available. 
Medium Moderate level of confidence in the assessment. Some scientific 
evidence and/or previous experience of somewhat similar situations is 
available. 
High Limited level of confidence in the assessment. Scientific evidence and 
previous experience is lacking; high degree of variation across the 
scenarios considered; high potential for variability in the outcomes.  
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due to cross-protection from existing coronaviruses in the Australian bat 
population; and c) the available scientific information on molecular 
analysis of the virus, and evidence that at least one bat species can be 
experimentally infected with SARS-CoV-2 [26]. 
3.1.2.3. Infected bat is: A) released; and B) transmits SARS-CoV-2 to 
another bat in the wild after release; and C) there is ongoing transmission 
sufficient for virus to establish in population. Only a proportion of rescued 
bats recover sufficiently in care to be released (e.g. [43]). As bats are 
usually in care for at least 1–2 weeks, some would likely complete the 
infectious period while in captivity [26]. If infected, it was considered 
unlikely that bats would display clinical signs, given the evident 
evolutionary relationship between bats and coronaviruses [2], and the 
results from initial experimental infections with SARS-CoV-2 in bats 
[26]. In the research context, almost every bat captured is released after 
short term handling and the infectious period would therefore occur in 
the wild. When compared to bats in rehabilitation that have recently 
recovered from illness or injury, bats captured for research are also more 
likely to be healthy and immunocompetent. 
Due to the colonial nature of Australian mainland flying-fox species, 
an infected individual would likely expose other flying-foxes to the 
virus. For other bat species there are significant species and seasonal 
differences in roosting behaviour. The highest risk will be for colonial 
species roosting in high densities in caves. Based on current 
epidemiological knowledge of other bat coronaviruses and the known 
circulation of betacoronaviruses in Australian bats [7–9], the virus 
would likely establish in the bat population. 
3.1.3. Likelihood of occurrence (introduction, exposure and establishment) 
For all pathways, the combination of introduction and exposure/ 
establishment scores resulted in an Extremely Low estimated likelihood 
of SARS-CoV-2 establishing in an Australian bat population as a result of 
human-to-bat transmission, with a High level of uncertainty. 
3.2. Consequence assessment 
Establishment of SARS-CoV-2 in an Australian bat population would 
result in conservation and animal welfare, public health, economic and 
social impacts. Based on the expertise in our group, only impacts for 
conservation and animal welfare were scored (Table 8). While the other 
categories were not formally assessed, they are also discussed below and 
were considered to have a lower consequence than conservation/animal 
welfare, so that the overall risk estimate is valid within our precau-
tionary approach. 
3.2.1. Conservation/animal welfare 
As explained above, it was considered unlikely that SARS-CoV-2 
would cause disease in bats. The conservation and welfare conse-
quences would therefore be secondary impacts due to human reactions 
to bats rather than primary impacts of the disease itself. A backlash 
against bats due to COVID-19 has already been reported in Australia and 
overseas [45–49]. Based on experience with other bat viruses, such as 
Australian bat lyssavirus and Hendra virus, likely human reactions 
include increased calls for dispersal and destruction of flying-fox roosts, 
culling of bats, and an escalation of anti-bat sentiment leading to cruelty, 
harassment and illegal killing [50,51]. As well as the severe animal 
welfare impacts, these types of actions would add to existing threats to 
species conservation and could conceivably lead to extinction of some 
species, particularly the endangered spectacled flying-fox (Pteropus 
conspicillatus). Serious ecosystem effects are likely to result from the 
extinction or population loss of flying-fox species, due to their role as 
Fig. 1. Steps in the likelihood assessment.  
Table 6 
Likelihood and uncertainty scores for introduction.  
Introduction pathway Likelihood Uncertainty 





a Scope limited to a person with occupational interaction with bats or a person 
visiting a cave for recreation. 
Table 7 
Likelihood and uncertainty scores for exposure/establishment.  
Exposure & establishment pathway Likelihood Uncertainty 
SARS-CoV-2 establishes in bat population as a result of initial transmission from: 
Bat carer to a flying-fox Low High 
Bat carer to other bat species Very low High 
Researcher/consultant to a flying-fox Very low High 
Researcher/consultant to other bat species Very low High 
Person visiting a cave to other bat species Very low High  
Table 8 
Consequence and uncertainty scores (conservation & animal welfare).  
Disease scenario Consequence Uncertainty 
SARS-CoV-2 established in a flying-fox 
population 
CATASTROPHIC LOW 
SARS-CoV-2 established in other bat population CATASTROPHIC LOW  
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long-distance pollinators and seed dispersers [52]. Erosion of the 
perceived biodiversity value of bats could result in loss of current pro-
tections for some threatened bat species. The conservation and animal 
welfare consequences were therefore rated as Catastrophic, with a Low 
level of uncertainty (Table 8). 
3.2.2. Public health 
If SARS-CoV-2 became established in bats it could potentially spill 
back to humans. Given the highly mobile nature of bats, and the low 
likelihood of SARS-CoV-2 infection significantly compromising their 
health, establishment of a reservoir in Australian bats could result in 
sporadic human cases or clusters, leading to ongoing public health de-
mands. Any future attempts to eradicate the virus would be complicated 
by an established wildlife reservoir. 
3.2.3. Economic 
Economic consequences - calibrated against other major events such 
as the pandemic as a whole, or Australia’s recent bushfires, etc. - may 
not be as severe as the public health and conservation consequences. 
These could include costs associated with the public health response, 
loss of overseas tourism, restriction of travel and closed borders, repu-
tational risk for Australia and potential trade impacts. At a more local 
level, there may be economic consequences associated with roost 
management, disruption of living arrangements of residents near roosts, 
and cost of risk communication by public health agencies, councils, etc. 
3.2.4. Social 
Public amenity impacts will vary between regions, being highest in 
urban and city settings where flying-foxes roost and forage, and 
particularly for houses near bat colonies, i.e. a severe impact on indi-
vidual people in specific areas. Impacts could include loss of access to 
parks and outdoor areas, anxiety due to proximity of flying-foxes, loss of 
large trees due to roost management, and the implications of contami-
nation of areas with bat faeces. For other bat species, a much lower 
proportion of people would be affected. 
3.3. Overall risk estimation 
The final estimation of the risk of SARS-CoV-2 establishing in an 
Australian bat population is Low, with a High level of uncertainty asso-
ciated with the estimate. 
4. Discussion 
Assessments of COVID-19 risk to wildlife differ from many other 
disease risk assessments in that they consider the possible transmission 
of a disease from humans to wildlife, i.e. a ‘reverse zoonosis’. We chose a 
rapid qualitative risk assessment approach and developed a framework 
based on established animal disease risk assessment processes, adapted 
to meet the needs of the situation and the Australian context, which 
differed from that on other continents [28,30–32]. 
Based on the situation and information available at the time of the 
assessment, the overall risk of human-to-bat transmission of SARS- CoV- 
2 in Australia was assessed to be Low. A UK risk assessment [30] simi-
larly found the overall risk to be low, while the US risk assessment [28] 
found a “non-negligible” risk, and the IUCN SSG Bat Specialist Group 
[31–33] found a “credible” risk of human-to-bat transmission of SARS- 
CoV-2. While similarities exist, it is difficult to directly compare our 
outcome with overseas assessments due to differences in approach and 
scope. For example, the UK study [30] assessed the ecological and 
environmental consequences of infection in bats to be low, based on the 
low likelihood of clinical disease associated with infection. In contrast, 
we considered negative human reactions to bats in rating the conser-
vation/animal welfare consequences as Catastrophic. The US risk 
assessment [28] used a quantitative approach with expert elicitation, 
and focussed on likelihood and effect of risk management actions, rather 
than a formal assessment of consequences. The scope of that assessment 
was specifically for little brown bats (Myotis lucifugus) as a surrogate 
species during the active bat season in temperate areas of North Amer-
ica. We assessed how the risk of SARS-CoV-2 transmission from people 
to bats varied between flying-foxes and other species, as a result of 
differences in their ecology and interactions with people. While our 
scope was broader, we acknowledged through the uncertainty ratings 
that the risk will not be the same across all bat populations in Australia, 
due to factors such as species susceptibility, location, ecology, behav-
iour, and frequency of contact with people. 
In our assessment, areas with high levels of uncertainty included bat- 
related factors such as susceptibility of Australian bat species within 
both suborders to SARS-CoV-2 infection and variation across bat pop-
ulations, and human-related factors such as variability in activities and 
biosecurity practices of people interacting with bats, and geographic 
variation in human COVID-19 prevalence. To manage the human- 
related factors, we advise that individuals assess their personal risk ac-
cording to their own particular circumstances, considering factors such 
as the number and nature of bat interactions and COVID-19 prevalence 
in their area. In the US risk assessment [28], critical uncertainties 
identified in the estimation of risk included the probability that a person 
working with bats is shedding virus, the replication of SARS-CoV-2 in 
bat tissue, and virus transmission within bat populations. The previous 
detection of various alpha- and betacoronaviruses in multiple Australian 
bat species [7–9] forms the basis for our greater certainty with respect to 
likely ongoing transmission in this assessment. The key factor influ-
encing the outcome of our risk assessment was the very low prevalence 
of COVID-19 in the Australian human population at the time of the 
assessment (and subsequently into the defined risk period), which 
resulted in an Extremely low likelihood of introduction. The assessment 
will thus need to be revisited if the prevalence changes significantly. 
The outcome of the assessment indicates that for situations where the 
human COVID-19 prevalence is very low, it is reasonable for research 
and rehabilitation of bats to continue; however, additional biosecurity 
measures over and above routine protocols should be applied. These 
measures are outlined for the Australian context in WHA’s guidelines 
[35]. Similar measures are outlined in the IUCN SSC Bat Specialist 
Group recommendations [31–33], and for wildlife more broadly in 
guidelines developed by the IUCN Wildlife Health Specialist Group and 
the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) [53]. Broadly speaking, 
the same precautions recommended for prevention of human-to-human 
transmission should be applied to interactions with bats, including not 
interacting if the person is a COVID-19 case or a close contact of a case, 
practicing good hygiene, and wearing a face mask where it is not 
possible to maintain physical distancing between the person and the bat. 
PPE is recommended along with dedicated clothing and regular cleaning 
of linen, equipment, enclosures and surfaces. Additional precautions 
recommended for rehabilitators include—where possible without 
compromising animal welfare—reducing the number of bats in care in 
individual homes, minimising the number of people interacting with 
bats in care, and avoiding unnecessary contact with the bats. If in-
dividuals assess their own risk as higher than outlined in this assessment, 
higher level precautions are recommended and, where feasible, it may 
be appropriate to restrict, postpone or cancel activities until the risk is 
reduced. 
Risk assessment is challenging for an emerging disease where in-
formation is lacking and the situation is changing rapidly. This was a 
rapid assessment using the best available information at the time, and 
reassessment will be needed as the COVID-19 situation changes and we 
learn more about the disease. As well as the direct outcomes of the 
assessment, we have provided a framework for risk assessments of other 
zoonotic diseases, in particular for potential transmission of disease 
from humans to wildlife. 
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C. Mettenleiter, A. Balkema-Buschmann, T. Harder, SARS-CoV-2 in fruit bats, 
ferrets, pigs, and chickens: an experimental transmission study, Lancet Microbe 1 
(5) (2020) e218–e225. 
[27] J.S. Hall, S. Knowles, S.W. Nashold, H.S. Ip, A.E. Leon, T. Rocke, S. Keller, 
M. Carossino, U. Balasuriya, E. Hofmeister, Experimental challenge of a North 
American bat species, big brown bat (Eptesicus fuscus), with SARS-CoV-2, 
Transbound. Emerg. Dis. (2020), https://doi.org/10.1111/tbed.13949. 
[28] M.C. Runge, E.H.C. Grant, J.T. Coleman, J.D. Reichard, S.E. Gibbs, P.M. Cryan, K. 
J. Olival, D.P. Walsh, D.S. Blehert, M.C. Hopkins, Assessing the risks posed by 
SARS-CoV-2 in and via North American bats—Decision framing and rapid risk 
assessment, US Geological Survey, 2020, https://doi.org/10.3133/ofr20201060. 
[29] K.J. Olival, P.M. Cryan, B.R. Amman, R.S. Baric, D.S. Blehert, C.E. Brook, C. 
H. Calisher, K.T. Castle, J.T. Coleman, P. Daszak, Possibility for reverse zoonotic 
transmission of SARS-CoV-2 to free-ranging wildlife: a case study of bats, PLoS 
Pathog. 16 (9) (2020), e1008758. 
[30] S.M. Common, T. Shadbolt, K. Walsh, A.W. Sainsbury, The risk from SARS-CoV-2 to 
bat species in England and mitigation options for conservation field workers, 
Transbound. Emerg. Dis. (2021), https://doi.org/10.1111/tbed.14035. 
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